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Bromley’s paper is a courageous one as it advances a different opinion to that held 
by the vast majority of economists and managers working on fisheries nowadays. 
He argues against the idea that property rights implementation in fisheries is the 
solution of over-fishing. And he is right! By giving examples of State interven-
tions designed to stop misuse of lands and forests in the United States he shows 
that it is not necessarily the case that because you own a piece of land or forest 
that you will make good use of it. We can perhaps go a step further by saying that 
even if you use properly the resources you own, your actions can impact badly on 
other users. Many current examples can offer testimony to this – fields of corn or 
wheat are contaminated by windborne pollen blown from fields growing geneti-
cally modified organisms or highly productive Caribbean sugarcane that kills the 
local coral reefs by pouring pesticides into the rivers. In the case of fisheries, 
scientists (both biologists and economists) and managers have ‘shrunk’ the sea 
by focusing upon the relationship of the fishermen to a single species – such as 
cod in the first half of the century – with the objective of maximizing catches of 
this species (without any concern to the impact upon other species). Anita Conti, 
in her book written in 1953, based on her numerous trips on board French vessels 
fishing on the Newfoundland banks, noticed that cod abundance was linked to sea 
temperatures and the presence of other species (as either prey or predators). She 
also highlighted the immense wastage that occurs within the cod fishery as the 
main part of the catch was thrown back into the sea because it was either under-
size cod or non-target species (Conti, 1953). Her prescient comments were largely 
ignored resulting in the crises in cod fishing that are so well known. In the classic 
Canadian case, the government closed the cod fishery only in 1992 despite the fact 
that for many years previously, fishermen had failed to reach the tac.
From Bromley’s perspective (on fishery management) this can mean one 
of four things. First, that the tac is not a cast-iron guarantee that there will be 
no over-fishing and stock collapse – as has been demonstrated in many cases in 
Europe and North America over the years. Second, and linked to the first point, 
there is great imprecision in the models deployed to define the state of fish stocks 
and the catch volume that can be taken out of the sea. The natural variability of 
fish stocks over time and space is always critical from one fishing season to the 
next, with generally bigger variations in pelagic than demersal abundance. It is 
therefore very difficult, if not impossible, to predict what will be available in the 
coming fishing season. The third point is that in reality fisheries are multi-species 
– even in so-called mono-specific fisheries. Fishermen net or trap not only tar-
geted species, but also ensnare other species. While many licence and tac systems 
allow fishermen to harvest a certain amount of such by-catch (which may actually 
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have a higher market price that targeted species), the widely observed tendency is 
for fishermen to under declare by-catches of high commercial value (and worse – 
to illegally target these species). To extend the consideration of this third point, 
one has to say that fishery economists ignore completely the natural variability of 
fish stocks, considering that fishery management is simply the management of 
fishermen – and not fish (which is the main cause of discord between them and 
biologists). Therefore, fishery management is reduced to the management of the 
production of natural resources in a predictable world with rational behaviour by 
fishermen. In that world, any fishery problem is due to an institutional failure that 
causes fishermen to not pursue the profit maximisation objective. To remedy this, 
fishery economists have promoted – for decades now – access control measures. 
Usually these start with licences, move to tacs and then follow on with quotas 
(collectively, then individually allocated, and now the latest version – individually 
transferable (itq)). itqs, as noted by Bromley, are today the most advanced system 
in terms of their sophistication. itqs determine not only the right to fish but, as 
Coase (1960) pointed out, a right to ‘do’ – which means (first) a right to undertake 
actions that impact upon the activities of others and (second) regulation of such 
economic activities that negatively affect other activities. In fishery terminology 
(and to extend Bromley’s criticisms), itq is the ‘perfect’ system. It excludes fisher-
men and it prevents new fishers from entering the fishery ( unless they have the 
means to purchase part of the quota). It does nothing to combat the significant 
level of discards of species which may have commercial value (and be the target of 
other fishermen). From the terrestial (or the management perspective), each step 
corresponds to an improvement of the system as things appear to be under greater 
control. The illusion of control is the fourth point to be highlighted. It is much 
more than the mis-choice of a system (itq versus ‘tac auction’). Thanks to the 
centralisation of fishery management systems in most countries across the world, 
fishery managers have tried to apply Bentham’s panopticon1 principle in order 
to control fisheries as they wish … from their comfortable offices (Failler, 1998). 
Non-compliance by fishers skewers such illusions of control. In summary, the 
introduction (and reinforcement) of management measures that are not in sym-
biosis with the natural cycle and variability of fish resources lead to an increase of 
economic costs and ecological waste.
The introduction of a tac auction system (as opposed to itqs) that Brom-
ley promotes is innovative and seems to be more appropriate in mature fisheries 
where the number of fishermen or companies is relatively settled, landing sites 
or ports are well controlled, scientific advice is readily available and interactions 
among marine species are low (as with the king crab or salmon fisheries in Alas-
ka). In other situations, characterised by low state control capacities, high species 
interactions, poor scientific advice and multi-species catches the application of tac 
auction systems seems to be less conceivable. In the context of a fishery auction, 
what will be fundamental is the revealing of the fishermen’s willingness to pay. If, 
as is usual, potential buyers (fishermen) have limited knowledge about the value of 
the asset or rights up for sale, it is invariably because the management institution 
has a limited knowledge of the value of catches. Vickrey (1961 and 1962) analyzed 
the properties of different kinds of auctions and attached particular importance to 
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the second-price auction or, as it is now often called, the Vickrey auction. In such 
an auction, tac share can be auctioned off by sealed bidding, where the highest 
bidder gets to buy the item, but only pays the next highest price offered. This is 
an example of a mechanism which elicits an individual’s true willingness to pay2. 
The main difficulties with the application of the classic auction or the Vickrey 
auction system in a fishery however is that one assumes that the future will be 
more or less similar to what the past was and the present is. Climate change or 
variability, to name only one factor that can affect fish stocks and more broadly 
marine ecosystems, is changing the face of fisheries around the world. So, how 
can we bid for something that may not exist anymore in two years time? From 
the property rights perspective, Bromley argues that the main difference between 
itqs and the tac auction is that the first system transfers ownership of resources 
from the State to fishermen while the second one gives the right to catch fish to 
fishermen (whilst the property is retained by the State). Is it such an improve-
ment (and for whom)? As we mentioned earlier, property rights not only engender 
the right to catch fish but also the right to undertake activities at sea that do not 
interfere with other activities. In both systems, fishermen buy the right to go fish-
ing for a certain amount of fish and therefore to affect (negatively) other (fishing) 
activities. More fundamentally, the tac auction is not a flexible system that can 
allocate fishery resources – which is indeed what all fisheries need. Somehow, 
in this sense, Bromley follows classic fishery economists in seeking to allocate to 
particular fishermen a particular amount of fish at a given price. However, other 
models of management based on economic performance and social cohesion exist 
and work, such as the Cofradias in Spain, or their counterpart, the Prudhommies in 
South of France. Uncertainty, risk, ecosystem functioning (where fish has a func-
tion value), species and fleet interactions are fundamental aspects of a fishery and 
need to be addressed when devising strategies for fishery management. So, who 
owns the coasts? Of course citizens, as Bromley has pointed out – but maybe more 
simply the person who looks at the sea in and for itself. It is a priceless property 
with the horizon as its only limit!
Notes
1 The Panopticon is a type of prison building designed by English philosopher Jeremy 
Bentham in 1785. The concept of the design is to allow an observer to observe (-opticon) all 
(pan-) prisoners without the prisoners being able to tell whether they are being watched, 
thereby conveying what one architect has called the ‘sentiment of an invisible omnis-
cience.’ Bentham himself described the Panopticon as ‘a new mode of obtaining power of 
mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without example.’
2 By bidding above his own willingness to pay, an individual runs the risk that someone else 
will bid likewise, and he is forced to buy the object at a loss. And vice-versa, if an individual 
bids below his own willingness to pay, he runs the risk of someone else buying the item at 
a lower price than the amount he himself is willing to pay. Therefore, in this kind of auc-
tion, it is in the individual’s best interest to state a truthful bid (Dreze, 1996).
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